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Article 9

Notes On Recent Cases
VIGLAS v. BOSTON, R. B. & L. R. CO.-Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk, Jan. 30,
1930 N. E. Vol. 169, No. 7; Page 780.
Court judicially knows that operation of the steam
railways is necessarily accompanied by some measure of
jolts, jerks, and lurches, notwithstanding care exercised.
Pierce, J. This is an action of tort t6 recover damages for
injuries sustained by the plaintiff while a passenger on one
of the defendant's trains, due to the alleged negligence of
its agents and servants.
The plaintiff testified that at nine o'clock in the evening of March 6, 1925, as passenger for hire, he and his
friend James J. Papas took a train of the defendant at
Playstead station for Boston; that it was a very bad night,
raining and snowing; that the train consisted of six cars
with a combination baggage and smoking car at the rear;
that the baggage compartment, which was in the front part
of the car, was about eight feet long and separated by a
partition from the smoking compartment; that from the
smoking compartment there was a door out to the car platform and a door into the baggage room, and there was a
door from the baggage room out to the other platform; that
he and his friend got on the train through the front platform and door, walked through the baggage compartment
into the smoking part of the car and sat in a seat three or
four feet from the partion between the compartments; that
as the train was coming into the terminal at East Boston
he, with Pappas and other passengers, got up, and holding
his valise in his right hand followed Pappas into the baggage compartment; that the door from the baggage compartment to the front platform was open and that Pappas
walked through and having hold of the railing, stood on the
car platform; that the plaintiff was about three feet from
the door to the outside platform and was just making a motion to take hold of the side of the door partition; that he
knew that the car was about to stop and was putting his
hand out "to catch hold of the side of the door to protect
himself"; that at that minute the train stopped so quickly
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that he lost his balance and fell forward; that his hands
went just across the threshold; on the outside platform and
his knees went right -down on the iron threshold; that the
jerk took place when he was putting his hand out and did
not have hold of anything that while he was attempting to
get up the train made four or five more jerks and threw
him back about four or five feet on the floor of the baggage
compartment.
These circumstances did not warrant the submission to
the jury of the issue of the defendant's negligence. This
is not a case to which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can
be applied.
It is common knowledge that the operation of steam
railways is necessarily accompanied by some measure of
jolts, jerks and lurches, especially observant at cross overs
and that such jars are inevitable even in the exercise of the
highest degree of care by the carrier which is consistent with
the reasonable transportation of passengers. There are no
facts in evidence which directly or inferentially, important
that the jolts and jerks which cause the fall of the plaintiff
were unusual and to such an extent out of the ordinary that
the jury reasonably could find that they were due to negligent management of the train. Byron v. Lynn & Boston
Railroad, 177 Mass. 303, 58, N. E. 1015; Weinschenk v.
New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. 190 Mass, 250, 76 N. E.
662; Foley v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 193 Mass. 332,
325, 79 N. E. 765, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1076.
We do not find it necessary to decide whether the conduct of the plaintiff in leaving his seat and placing himself
in a position where he might be hurt if he should lose his
balance by a jolt of the car was negligent as matter of law.
The motion for a directed verdict for the defendant
should have been granted. In accordance with the stipulation it follows that "judgment shall be entered for the
defendant."

So ordered.

WM. JUDGE.

INFANTS.--Where infant, because of circumstances,
coupled with false representations that he is of age, induces
another to contract, he is estopped from disafirming his
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contract. Pinnacle Motor Co. v. Daugherty. 21 S. W.
(2d) 1001 (Ky.)

The plaintiff, an infant, agreed with the Pinnacle
Motor Car Co. to trade his Chevrolet sedan in on a Pontiac,
and to pay a balance due in monthly installments. Soon
after the plaintiff received the car, it was partially wrecked
in a collision with a railroad train. This is an action to recover the value of the Chevrolet and money paid on the
installments. The defendant pleads as a defense that the
plaintiff is estopped from setting up his infancy in disaffirming his contract because of falsely misrepresenting his age,
and because the plaintiff, at the time of entering into the
contract appeared to be twenty-one years of age. Court
held that the defendant's contention would have been sustained under the rule, "where an infant, by reason of his personal appearance, and family surroundings, business activities, coupled with a false representation that he is of
age, induces the other party to make a contract, he will be
estopped from maintaining an action to disaffirm his executed contract," but the evidence in this case failed to support the rule. Judgment for the plaintiff.
As to whether or not an infant is estopped from disaffirming his contract where he falsely misrepresents his age,
and where the situation and appearance of the alleged infant at the time are such as tend to corroborate the statement as to his being of full age, there is a conflict of authority. Some jurisdictions hold that the fact that an infant at
the time of entring into such transaction falsely represented to the person with whom he dealt that he was of age
does not give any alidity to the transaction or estop the
infant from disaffirming the same or setting up the defense
of infancy, against the enforcement of any rights thereunder. 258 S. W. 975 (Ark.); 121 A. 888 (Conn.); 17
N. E. 265 (Ind.); 146 N. E. 658 (Mass.); 34 Am. Dec.
146 (N. H.) ; 116 S. E. 261 (N. C.) ; 99 N. E. 722 (N. Y.) ;

128 S. E. 34 (S. C.) ; 31 Am. Rep. 678 (Vt.). The doctrine
that an estoppel in pais is not applicable to infants was followed in MacGreal v. Taylor, 167 U. S. 688, and seems to
have become the established federal rule. 30 Fed. 697; 102
U. S. 300.
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On the other hand, there are numerous decisions holding that an infant who falsely represents himself to be of
age under circumstances which tend to corroborate his statements will be estopped from maintaining an action to avoid
his executed contract. 125 S. E. 787 (Ga.); 22 P. 1016
(Kan.) ; 255 S. W. 854 (Ky.); 49 So. 569 (Miss.); 232 P.
531 (Mont.); 185 N. W. 1000 (Neb.); 245 S. W. 478
(Tex.); 108 S. E. 568 (Va.); 126 N. W. 50 (Wis.) In
New Jersey an infant is estopped from disaffirming his
contract where he falsely misrepresents his age if he has
received any benefits from his contract. 105 A. 201. But
if he has not received any benefits from his contract, he is
not estopped. 117 A. 638.
Finally, there is a group of states who have passed
statutes providing that no contract or transaction can be
disaffirmed where, on account of the infant's misrepresentation as to his majority, the other party had good reason to
believe the infant capable of contracting. 185 N. W. 32
(Iowa); 174 S. W. 146 (Mo.); 240 P. 921 (Wash.)
-JOSEFPHr YOCH.

EASEMENTS - To abandon easement created by
deed, owner of servient estate, in addition to nonuser, must
act inconsistently with the easement. Richardson v. Turnbridge, 149 Atl. 241 (Conn.)
The plaintiffs seek in this action a judgment declaring
that their land is no longer subject to the easement which
was granted by their predecessor in title to Corlies the predecessor in title of defendant in favor of the land now owned
by the latter. The deed granted to Corlies, his heirs, and
assigns the privilege of constructing a drain from land of
Corlies to land of his and with specified dimensions and
certain kind of drainage tile and qualifications that the said
drain shall always be allowed to be kept open so as to drain
the water from the grantee's land and with the privilege of
going on and repairing the said pipe or drain when necessary. Corlies and his heirs failed to ever construct any such
drain but from time to time defendants have gone upon the
land of plaintiff and dug out the stream on boundary line
and used it as a drain. Plaintiffs contend that the easement
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granted by deed is thus extinguished and plaintiff's land
is no longer subject to it.
The general rule is that an easement may be extinguished by a written release or by an abandonment of his
right by the owner of the dominant estate, but whether there
has been an abandonment is a question of fact and not of
law, the proof must clearly indicate that it was the intention
of the owner of the dominant estate to abandon the easement. Mere nonuser of an easement created by deed, however long continued, is insufficient to establish abandonment.
There must also be some conduct on the part of the owner
of the servient estate adverse to and inconsistent with the
existence of the easement and continuing for the statutory
period, or the nonuser must be accompanied by unequivocal
and decisive acts clearly indicating an intent on the part of
the owner of the easement to abandon the use of it. Schroeder v. Taylor, 104 Conn. 596, American Brass Co. v. Serra,
104 Conn. 139, Steuck v. Murphy, 107 Conn. 656.
An intention to abandon a right so formally granted
and with such precision of definition in favor of a right already possessed is not to be imputed to the grantee of such
right and his successor in title merely from the fact of their
failure to build the drain and resting content with the drainage furnished by the flow of the stream.
If his action in excavating the bed of the stream was
anything more than the exercise of his rights as an upland
proprietor, it was at most a use of his easement in a manner
different from that allowed in his deed. "The fact that the
dominant owner has used or proposes to use the easement
in a manner different from that allowed by the deed does
not extinguish the right-the remedy in such case being by
action." 9 Ruling Case Law.
A right of way is not extinguished by the habitual use
by its owner of another way equally convenient, unless there
has been an intentional abandoment of the former way.
Nichols v. Peck, 70 Conn. 439, Adams v. Hodgkins, 109
Me. 361, Trimble v. King, 131 Ky. 1.
Such use of a different method of drainage may indicate an intention of abandonment of an easement when the
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owner of the right does or permits to be done some act inconsistent with its future enjoyment. But the excavation of
the bed of the stream by Corlies, and the continued use of
the stream for drainage was not inconsistent with an intention when occasion required to exercise this right. The
clearing out of the bed of the stream in no way interfered
with the building of the drain utilizing the flow of the stream.
This is an interest in the land, formally granted for a
valuable consideration, and its abandonment can only be
established by unequivocal and decisive acts clearly indicating such intention. The conclusion of the court is that
neither defendant or his predecessors entitle have done any
acts indicating an intention to abandon the right created by
grant of this easement.
-CARtL FRANKOVITCH.
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES-Defendant's reply, "go ahead" to officers who stated they had warrant to
search his home for stolen goods, held not waiver of Constitutional right and consent to search-State v. Littleton
(West Virginia) 151 S. E.. 713.
Defendant was charged and conivicted of breaking and'
entering a certain barn belonging to Frank Reed and stealing a riding saddle and check lines. The evidence against
the defendant was obtained by virtue of the search of the
defendant's home by officers. Further evidence goes to show
that officers, arriving at the home of the defendant, entered
and told the defendant that they had a search warrant and
also a warrant for him. The defendant under the belief that
the officers had such warrants told them to "go ahead" without seeing the warrant.
The question to be decided by this court is whether the
defendant here by his statement "go ahead" in response to
the officer's declaration that he had a search warrant waive
his Constitutional right and consent to search?
It is admitted that the defendant may waive his Cdnstitutional rights at the time the search and seizure is madeCornelius Search & Seizures 17 pg. 73. But before a court
can hold that a person has waived any of his Constitutional
rights, it must be able to find a waiver by clear and positive
testimony. And, in order to hold in this case that the de-
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fendant waived his right, it must be shown that the defendant replied-"go ahead" to a statement from the officer that
he had no warrant. But the response made by the defendant
to the officers under the circumstances cannot be construed
as such a waiver of his rights.
The states attorney admits that the exact question has
never been decided by this court nor is any case cited by him
upon the precise question from other jurisdictions. On the
contrary, it has been held that there is no voluntary permission to search when the defendant was told by the officers
that they had a search warrant to search his place for liquor
whereupon the defendant said, "all right, white folks; search
my house whenever you get ready"-Morton v. State, 136
Miss. 284; 101 So. 379.
The principle involved here is not unimportant. The
maxim that "every man's house is his castle" is made a part
of our Constitutional law in clauses prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures, and has always been looked upon
as of high value to the citizen.
FRAUDULENT

"-CARL FRANKOVITCH.

CONVEYANCES -

Husband

taking exclusive title to realty purchased with wife's money
held entitled to convey it to her in satisfaction of debt as
against other creditors. First National Bank v. Rush.
(Ind.)
Action by the First National Bank against defendants
to set aside an alleged fraudulent conveyance of real estate
made by the defendant Rush to his wife. It appeared that
defendant's wife, Minnie Rush, was owner in her own name
of certain real estate which she sold for $15,000. Andrew
Rush then received from his wife the said $15,000 under an
agreement to invest it in real estate in their joint names as
tenants by entireties, but that in violation of such agreement
he took the title to such real estate in his own -name and
so held it for a period of twelve years, during all of which
time Minnie Rush after her discovery of the breach of trust,
protested against such action and demanded that her interests be protected as agreed and her husband promised to
have the said title made perfect, but failed to do so and for
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several years he received the rents, profits, and benefits
therefrom to his" own use. Subsequently, Andrew Rush
agreed with Minnie Rush to convey to .her the real estate so
purchased in satisfaction and settlement of his debt to his
wife. He then executed and delivered to her his warranty
deed to the said real estate, and at the same time he was
heavily indebted to the plaintiffs. Minnie Rush knew nothing about her husband's indebtedness and such deed was not
accepted by her with intent to cheat, hinder, or defraud
the creditors of her husband, but in good faith and complete
satisfaction of her husband's indebtedness to her.
There appeared to be a direct breach of a trust. It is
the law that one who receives the moneys of another to be
applied to a particular purpose, and fails so to apply he may
be sued either at law for. money had and received, or in
equity as a trustee, for a breach of his trust.
Andrew Rush cannot be permitted so to breach his
trust to his own profit without being required to account so
far as possible for him to do. Eventually, he recognized his
moral as well as his legal duty to his wife as his creditor
rather than to those creditors to whom he was obligated as
the surety for others. This he had a right to do. Dice v.
Irvin (110 Ind. 561), Larch v. Holz (58 Ind. App. 56),
Napanee Canning Co. v. Reid Murdock and Co. (159 Ind.
614), Young v. Merle (184 Ind. 408).
Under the circumstances it would be wholly inequitable
not to charge Andrew Rush as trustee, with the legal rate
of interest upon the trust money, as he had used the money
in the purchase of real estate for himself thereby converting
it to his own use and profit.
As a general rule, in the absence of anything to the
contrary, the question of requiring a trustee to pay interest
on the trust funds is one which must depend upon the facts
and circumstances in each particular case; and where good
conscience requires that the trustee be charged with interest,
the payment thereof ought to be exacted. Miller v. Billingsly (41 Ind. 489), Pittsburgh,Fort Wayne and Chicago
R. R. Co. v. Swinney (97 Ind. 586).
In fact, it may be asserted that the case at bar falls
within that clause of the interest statute which provides that
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"on money had and received for the use of another, and retained without his consent, interest shall be allowed at rate
of $6 per year on $100.00." (*7045, Burns' 1901).
Consequently, under the facts it was perfectly proper
for the jury to allow the legal rate of interest on the money
in question from the date it was received by the trustee.
-J.

H. TUBERTY.

ACTION - Where injuries to caddy attacked by
golfer were slight, but sufficient to entitle him to damages,
doctrine of de minimus non curat lex was inapplicable.
That caddy attacked by golfer might have instituted criminal proceedings did not preclude right to recover damages
in civil proceedings. Holmes et ux v. Warren, Ct. Appeals,
Louisiana. 1930.
It is alleged that the defendant, a golf player, attacked
the plaintiff, a caddy employed by another player engaged
in the same contest. It appears that the defendant, in the
course of his game, shot a golf ball which the- caddy told
him had gone out of bounds, but which, in fact, had not
done so, and the defendant became so enraged with the
caddy that he struck him with one of the iron golf clubs.
The record does not show that the caddy had done or said
anything sufficiently improper to provoke even the most ungovernable temper, and in fact, we know of no words which
would justify an assault upon a defenseless negro.
It is contended by the defendant's counsel that the doctrine "de mimimus non curat lex" (the law is not concerned
with trifles) is applicable here. The court was of the opinion
that this doctrine cannot be applied. It is true, as we have
said, that the injuries were very slight, but, nevertheless,
they are sufficient to entitle the injured party to recover.
Defendant's counsel further contends that the redress for
an attack of this kind should be obtained in a criminal court.
Here again, the court was not of that mind. It is quite true
that criminal proceedings might have been brought, but that
fact in no way interferes with the right to recover in a civil
suit or proceedings. We think $50 sufficient to compensate
the boy for his inconvenience and suffering and possible
loss of earning capacity for a few days. It was so ordered,
adjudged and decreed.
G. FEDDE..
-FRAxcis
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EXCESSIVE BAIL-The Eighth Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States declares that "excessive bail shall not be required." The United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently upheld
that declaration of the Federal Bill of Rights in the case
of John Floros and Frank Eades v. United States of America, decided March 17th, 1930, and not as yet reported.
Petitioners were indicted for conspiracy to violate the
National Prohibition Act. The United States Commissioner
fixed their bonds at $15,000 for Floros and $7,500.00 for
Eades, which was later affirmed by the Federal Court for the
Northern District of Indiana. Whereupon petitioners appealed on the ground that the .bail demanded was excessive,
and the Appellate Court ordered the bond of Floros reduced
to $5,000.00 and that of Eades to $2,000.00.
The court in its written memorandum of views stated:
"The court is not passing on defendants' guilt when it considers his financial ability to furnish bail bond. The testimony as to petitioner's ability to raise the bond is conflicting. Petitioners have been in jail now nearly four months,
from which fact it is argued that if bail was obtainable they
would have gotten it before now."
It was argued on behalf of the government that the
trial of the case would shortly take place and therefore there
was no special urge for the modification of the bail. In this
regard the court stated: "It is apparent that defendants
can assist in the preparation of their cases much more effectively if at large than if locked up in jail. Surely an accused professing innocence should, where reasonably possible, be at large, that he may adequately prepare for trial."
-RO0BERT F. EGGEMAw.

